Abstract: Ensuring reliability and security has been a challenge in modern communication systems. To achieve these challenges, a novel reliable and secure communication system is designed in this paper. Reliability is achieved by constructing a class of error correcting codes called concatenated kernel codes. Security in terms of source authentication is achieved from using graph nature of trellis employing techniques from graph theory namely fundamental cut-set and fundamental circuit. It has been shown that the proposed communication framework achieves the goal of reliability and security considering the channel noise and cryptanalytic attacks. The theoretical basis of the proposed framework is validated and its performance is evaluated through simulations.
Introduction
Reliable and secure communication has been a challenge in digital communication. The advances made in attaining this challenge are largely developed independently. Reliability is achieved using principles of error correcting codes largely at the lower layer, i.e., physical layer and security is achieved using principles of cryptography at the higher layers of communication systems.
In the resource constrained communication systems such as low power sensor networks (Akyildiz et al., 2002a (Akyildiz et al., , 2002b and applications involving transmission of voice or video (Tosun and Feng, 2001) , it is desirable to have lightweight security or weak secrecy cryptographic methods to achieve security rather than employing hardcore cryptographic principles involving huge computational cost (Harrison et al., 2013 ). An interesting problem to investigate in such resource constrained environment and in applications involving transmission of voice or video is to verify the authenticity of data, i.e., whether the data being received is from actual sender or from other sources.
On the other hand, to achieve reliability, error correction coding techniques are used. At the receiver while decoding, the possible errors during transmission are corrected. One such technique is to decode codes on graphs such as trellis (Forney, 1973 (Forney, , 2001 . Trellis are introduced by Forney to represent the codes (Vardy, 1998) . Trellis representation of codes gained importance due to the advantage of decoding raw channel output symbols without the process of quantisation of outputs as in case of algebraic decoding (Priti, 2003) . Kschischang and Sorokine (1995) defined trellis for a block code C of length n is an edge labelled directed graph with a distinguished 'root' vertex having in-degree zero and a distinguished 'goal' vertex having out-degree zero, and with the following properties: 1 all vertices can be reached from the root 2 the goal can be reached from all vertices 3 the number of edges traversed in passing from the root to the goal along any path is n 4 the set of n-tuples obtained by 'reading off' the edge labels encountered in traversing all paths from the root to the goal is C.
Graph nature of trellis (Muder, 1988) makes it feasible to employ techniques from graph theory. Fundamental cut-set is computed at the sender and the same will be employed at the receiver to verify the authenticity of edge by forming fundamental circuits (acting as key).
In error correction coding, the message m of length k to be transmitted will be encoded at the sender side from elements of an algebraic structure. The received encoded message will be decoded at the receiver correcting errors if any due to the channel noise. In other words, encoding can be defined as an injective mapping function E as follows (Sudan, 2001) :
where E is the encoding function, M is the finite message set, of which message m is a member and Σ is a finite alphabet on which the message m is mapped on to of length n.
Transmitted message is given by a mapping function E(m).
Similarly, decoding function D is given as a mapping function as follows:
where Σ n is the received codeword of length n and M is the finite message set. In the presence of channel noise, suppose say η ∈ Σ n , the decoding function D has to decode received message y, given by y = E(m) + η and produce output D(y) = m.
In this paper, techniques of error control coding, cryptography and graph theory are employed for achieving reliable and secure communication. Security is achieved from exploiting the graph nature of trellis, providing lightweight authentication without employing additional cryptographic principles. Reliability is achieved by constructing concatenated kernel codes capable of correcting errors.
The paper is organised as follows: the preliminaries necessary for proposing the communication framework is discussed in Section 2. A novel reliable and secure communication system framework is discussed in Section 3. An example discussing the complete methodology developed in accordance with the proposed communication framework is given in Section 4. The properties of proposed framework are given in Section 5. Simulation results carried out for verifying the proposed framework is given in Section 6. Conclusions are summarised in Section 7.
Preliminaries

Kernel codes
Let G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , …, G n be groups, G = G 1 × G 2 × … × G n and S be an abelian group with identity element e. The kernel of homomorphism µ : G 1 × G 2 × … × G n → S is defined as µ(g 1 , g 2 , …, g n ) = µ 1 (g 1 )µ 2 (g 2 )…µ n (g n ) is called kernel code where, µ i is a homomorphism from G i → S, i = 1, 2, 3, …, n. Clearly µ is a homomorphism (Selvakumar and Balasubramani, 2004) . Homomorphism mapped to identity element of abelian group called as kernel of homomorphism (Moon, 2005) . These homomorphisms can be defined as required to applications either as binary or non-binary.
Definition 1: For a given (G, µ, S) , the subgroup C = {(g 1 , g 2 , …, g n )/µ(g 1 , g 2 , …, g n ) = e} is called kernel code.
The rate of kernel code, a class of group codes is given by 1 log | |
where, n is the word length and | G | is the number of codewords or the kernel of homomorphism.
Kernel code construction
Kernel codes are computed by the definition mentioned above in Section 2.1. Algorithm 1 computes the kernel codes. (Vardy, 1998) . Triplet (v i , a, v i+1 ) indicates the trellis edge from present state vi to next state v i+1 with label a. Such triplets are constructed for the group of kernel codes K = {k 1 , k 2 , … , k n } and trellis graph will be constructed accordingly. The trellis path from 'root' vertex to 'goal' vertex in the trellis is a valid codeword of code C and the number of such paths is equal to the number of codewords possible for the code C.
• Trellis construction procedure:
Let S 0 = {e}, e is the identity element of S. Trellis for the non-binary kernel codes constructed in Section 2 is shown in Figure 1 and triplets for the trellis construction of kernel codes is computed as shown below:
The following Examples 2 and 3 discuss the construction of kernel code and trellis triplet computation using from Algorithm 1 and 2, respectively.
Example 2: Let Z 2 and Z 3 be the group of finite sets with elements Z 2 = {0, 1} and Z 3 = {0, 1, 2}. Non-binary kernel codes are obtained by homomorphism of finite Z 2 and Z 3 groups over abelian group. Z 2 is also an abelian group defined over modulo 2 addition with 0 being identity element and binary operation +.
Consider Z 2 × Z 3 × Z 2 → Z 2 be finite groups with homomorphisms µ i defined as
The Cartesian products of above defined finite groups are {000, 001, 010, 011, 020, 021, 100, 101, 110, 111, 120, 121}.
By applying the homomorphisms defined, we obtain {000, 011, 021, 100, 111, 121} as kernel codes which satisfies the condition µ 1 (g 1 ) + µ 2 (g 2 ) + µ 3 (g 3 ) = 0. Thus, obtained codes are non-binary and form the kernel of homomorphism.
Trellis for the binary kernel codes constructed in Example 2 is shown in Figure 1 and the triplets for the kernel codes are computed as follows: Example 3: Let Z be the group of integers. Binary kernel codes are obtained by homomorphism of finite Z 2 groups over abelian group Z 2 . Z 2 is an abelian group defined over modulo 2 addition with 0 being identity element and binary operation +.
Binary kernel codes are defined by taking finite groups and defining homomorphisms. Consider Z 2 × Z 2 × Z 2 × Z 2 → Z 2 be finite groups with homomorphisms µ i defined as
The Cartesian products of above defined finite groups are {0000, 0001, 0010, 0011, 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111, 1000, 1001, 1010, 1011, 1100, 1101, 1110, 1111}. By applying the homomorphisms defined, we obtain {0000, 0101, 0111, 1010, 1101, 1111} as kernel codes which satisfies the condition µ 1 (g 1 ) + µ 2 (g 2 ) + µ 3 (g 3 ) + µ 4 (g 4 ) = 0. Thus, obtained codes are binary in nature and form the kernel of homomorphism.
Trellis for the binary kernel codes constructed in Example 3 is shown in Figure 2 and the triplets for the kernel codes are computed as follows: 
Concatenated kernel code
Concatenated codes introduced by Forney (1966) with inner code and outer code gained importance in communication problem and are being extensively used in Voyager Space Mission by NASA (TM CCSDS, 2003) . Concatenated kernel code is constructed with inner kernel code and outer code as follows:
• Inner code Let S be an abelian group and µ i : G → S for i = 1, 2, …, k be homomorphisms.
The kernel of µ is defined as inner code.
• Outer code Let G be an abelian group and µ :
. h i 's can be chosen as applicable for error correction. Image of µ′ is defined as the outer code.
Concatenated kernel code is the images of the elements of kernel µ • µ′ under µ′.
Concatenated kernel code construction
Kernel codes are computed by Algorithm 1 and the concatenated kernel code is computed using Algorithm 3. In Example 4, construction of concatenated kernel code and subsequent trellis construction is discussed. 
13: add to set C 14: return C Set of concatenated kernel codes
15: end for
Example 4: Let Z 2 and Z 3 be the group of finite sets with elements Z 2 = {0, 1} and Z 3 = {0, 1, 2}. Kernel codes are obtained by homomorphism of finite Z 2 and Z 3 groups over abelian group. Z 2 is also an abelian group defined over modulo 2 addition with 0 being identity element and binary operation +.
Consider Z 2 × Z 3 × Z 2 → Z 2 be finite groups with homomorphisms µi defined as µ 1 (0) = 0, µ 1 (1) = 0, µ 2 (0) = 0, µ 2 (1) = 1, µ 2 (2) = 1, µ 3 (0) = 0, µ 3 (1) = 1. The Cartesian products of above defined finite groups are {000, 001, 010, 011, 020, 021, 100, 101, 110, 111, 120, 121}.
By applying the homomorphisms defined, we obtain {000, 011, 021, 100, 111, 121} as kernel codes which satisfies the condition µ 1 (g 1 ) + µ 2 (g 2 ) + µ 3 (g 3 ) = 0. Thus, obtained codes form the kernel of homomorphism.
To construct the concatenated kernel codes, the parity bits are added to the kernel codes. Homomorphisms for the outer code is defined as follows: µ 4 (0) = 0, µ 4 (1) = 1, µ 5 (0) = 0, µ 5 (1) = 0.
By the defined homomorphisms and inner kernel code, the concatenated kernel codes is constructed from µ′(g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) = (µ 1 (g 1 ), µ 2 (g 2 ), µ 3 (g 3 ), µ 4 (g 1 + g 2 ), µ 5 (g 2 + g 3 ) = (µ 1 (g 1 ), µ 2 (g 2 ), µ 3 (g 3 ), µ 4 (g 4 ), µ 5 (g 5 )) as follows: We obtain {00000, 01110, 02101, 10010, 11100, 12111} as concatenated kernel codes. Trellis for concatenated kernel codes is computed from Algorithm 2 by computing trellis triplets first and then constructing trellis as shown in Figure 3 . 
Fundamental cut-sets and fundamental circuits in cryptography
Graph theory preliminaries are discussed in the Appendix. The circuit obtained by adding a chord to a spanning tree is called a fundamental circuit. In other words, the set of edges, whose removal from the connected graph, makes exactly the same components of vertices made by the removal of a branch from spanning tree. It is also important to note that a fundamental cut-set or fundamental circuit has meaning only with respect to a given spanning tree and no others, which motivates the fact to use such concept in design of authentication algorithms.
In adding the security feature to the spanning tree (Selvakumar and Gupta, 2012; Selvakumar et al., 2015) , i.e., adding encryption and decryption, the following theorems (Deo, 2004) are useful.
Theorem 5: With respect to a given spanning tree T, a branch b i that determines the fundamental cut-set S is contained in every fundamental circuit associated with the chords in S, and in no others.
Theorem 6: With respect to a given spanning tree T, a chord c i that determines the fundamental circuit C occurs in every fundamental cut-set associated with the branches in C, and in no others.
Proposed framework
To provide reliable and secure communication by using graph nature of trellis and resource constrained environments, a novel framework is proposed as shown in Figure 5 , where in message being encoded and encrypted at the sender side and decrypted and decoded at the receiver side. The proposed framework is similar to private key cryptosystem. Message is encoded at the sender using concatenated kernel codes. Constructed concatenated kernel code is represented using trellis. Every path in the trellis graph from 'root' vertex to 'goal' vertex is a valid codeword of constructed concatenated kernel code. Spanning tree is constructed from the trellis graph of the concatenated kernel code such that each spanning tree contains a valid codeword (or path) from source to sink vertex. Thus, making sure that spanning tree obtained from trellis graph contains a valid codeword of concatenated kernel code. Fundamental cut-set is obtained at the sender by performing arbitrary cut on an edge of spanning tree. The fundamental cut-set elements act as a key at the receiver to authenticate the received spanning tree. If not authenticated such edges will be discarded and not processed further. At the receiver side, edges which are authenticated will be processed further and decoded using maximum likelihood Viterbi decoder (Forney, 1973; Vardy, 1998) to obtain the actual message correcting errors if any occurred during transmission. The proposed framework provides defence against some of the attacks like replay attack, man-in-the middle attack, cipher text only attack. Proposed cryptosystem is explained with an example in Section 4.
Illustration of proposed framework
The constructed trellis represents all the codewords of code. Such codes in the trellis T are the disjoint paths from 'root' to 'goal' vertex which are transmitted individually. The disjoint paths from source to destination can be used for constructing cryptosystem. Making use of existing states in the trellis T and applying concepts of graph theory such cryptosystem is feasible. Spanning tree is constructed from the trellis T.
A codeword over trellis can be represented as a spanning tree. Trellis in Figure 4 , can be represented by separate spanning trees as shown in Figures 6, 7 , 8, 9, 10 and 11 which contains codewords 00000, 01110, 10010, 02101, 11100 respectively as a path. Even other possible spanning trees are possible for trellis T. The only condition imposed on constructing spanning tree of trellis T is that, it should contain a valid codeword as a path from 'root' to 'goal' vertex along with other edges. Suppose a cut is made on an arbitrary edge of spanning tree containing codeword 01110 as shown in Figure 7 , the fundamental cut-set formed from trellis graph in Figure 3 will be {0, 1, 2}. The process of generating the fundamental cut-set is given in Algorithm 4. Cut-set obtained at sender acts as a key at the receiver to form fundamental circuit and in turn authenticate the edge transmitted from the sender. At receiver, the received spanning tree which in turn contains the codeword 01110 will be tested for the authenticity by forming fundamental circuits. Ignoring the edge label 1 of the spanning tree as cut was made over that edge, the fundamental cut-set elements {1} and {2} will act as key. From the cut-set elements {1} and {2}, the fundamental circuits formed are {BDB, BCEDB} as shown in Figure 13 and 14 respectively. The process of generating the fundamental circuit is given in algorithm 5. In both the circuits formed the edge {BD} alone remains common making the edge authentic. Thus, the authenticity of trellis edge is established at the receiver. Further, the message authenticated will be decoded using maximum likelihood Viterbi decoder. The flows are computed at the 'goal' vertices of the trellis graph, in the present example 'goal' vertices are {H, I}. The flow on trellis path for the code, i.e., φ(H ∪ I) is computed as follows using Viterbi algorithm (Vardy, 1998) .
0) ({01, 11, 02, 12} 1) {000, 100,11, 111, 021, 121} In the computed trellis flow paths, only the ones which are computed as codewords will be considered for Maximum likelihood decoding based on Viterbi algorithm. The set of computed flow paths also includes the codewords of constructed concatenated kernel code, i.e., {00000, 01110, 02101, 10010, 11100, 12111}. Thus, the constructed concatenated kernel code in example 4 is represented by the trellis in Figure 3 . Maximum likelihood decoder with Viterbi algorithm works as follows: At each section of trellis edges, minimum distance (hamming distance) between edges label will be computed from present section to next section, only minimum cost path is taken. Continuing the same procedure on all edges, the minimum cost path is known from 'root' vertex to 'goal' vertex.
Suppose receiver receives an erroneous codeword {11000} instead of {11100} then the maximum likelihood decoder decodes trellis path as shown in Figure 15 taking minimum distance path. Similarly, the minimum cost path is calculated among all sections. Once the minimum path is computed, the trellis minimum cost path is traced back to 'root' vertex and decoder outputs {11100} as codeword correcting the error. Thus, reliability is achieved. 
Properties of proposed framework
The following theorem established the basis of providing authenticity. Corollary 7 is a direct result of Theorem 6.
Corollary 7:
The proposed framework accepts an edge if and only if it is authenticated.
Proof: Suppose an edge e is received at receiver, fundamental circuits are constructed with the corresponding spanning tree received. Among all the fundamental circuits formed, only edge e will be common and no others. Thus, the edge e will be verified to be accepted by the framework.
Conversely, an edge e is accepted by the framework. The corresponding edge has to be common with all circuits constructed and no in others. □ Remark 1: Proposed framework accepts only the authenticated edges and no others, providing defence against man-in-the-middle attacks.
Corollary 8: A cut-set will have meaning only with respect to a spanning tree and no others.
Proof: From the definition of fundamental cut-set it is evident that fundamental cut-set will have only one branch of the spanning tree and remaining elements are chords or edges from the graph from which spanning tree is constructed. Thus, a cut set will be unique for every spanning tree and thus have meaning only for that particular spanning tree and no others. □
Remark 2:
This property provides defence against replay attack where in the keys are frequently changed so that the attacker cannot save the key and use it for later instance.
Experimental results
As stated earlier, our proposed scheme aims to provide reliable and secure communication. Therefore, they must achieve reliability and security. To evaluate the performance of proposed scheme, the following experimental setup is developed and tested using simulation. The proposed algorithms are implemented in MATLAB running on a Windows XP machine with Intel Xeon processor equipped with 4 GB RAM. Kernel codes and concatenated kernel codes are computed and transmitted in presence of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Kernel codes are computed from Algorithm 1. For the computed Kernel codes, Trellis triplets are computed from Algorithm 2.
Similarly, concatenated kernel codes are computed from Algorithm 3. Redundancy bits are added to the kernel codes thus forming concatenated kernel code. The redundancy bits added at the sender helps in correcting errors at the receiver. For the constructed concatenated kernel code, trellis triplet is computed from Algorithm 2. Maximum likelihood Viterbi decoder implemented at the receiver is employed decode kernel code as well the concatenated kernel code, to get the actual message.
BER vs. E b /N 0 is plotted to test the performance of kernel codes and concatenated kernel code. Twelve bits are transmitted per second and each BER is simulated thirty times per SNR. For the constructed concatenated kernel code in Examples 2 and 4, BER performance is plotted in presence of AWGN noise. It is evident from the plot in Figure 16 that concatenated kernel codes provide better performance over kernel code with coding gain of 0.55 dB at 10 -3 BER. Fundamental cut-sets and fundamental circuits are employed at sender and receiver to provide security. Only the verified edges will be accepted by the system. The acceptance ratio of concatenated kernel code is higher compared to with that of kernel code. Attacks are simulated by transmitting additional dummy spanning trees along with the actual spanning trees in the channel, to test whether the developed system accepts the dummy spanning trees. The presence of additional spanning trees can be known from Figure 17 ; where in existence of additional dummy spanning trees injected into the system is shown.
System only accepts the verified fundamental circuits and rejects others as shown in Figure 18 .
Figure 18
Ratio of accepted spanning trees by the system (see online version for colours)
Conclusions
In this paper, a novel communication framework is introduced. The framework provides reliability by employing concatenated kernel codes and security to authenticate the sender at the receiver using techniques of fundamental cut-set and fundamental circuit. Through simulations it has been shown that concatenated kernel codes provides better performance over kernel codes. Also, it has been shown that the framework provides defence against the man-in-the-middle attack, cipher text only attack as a lightweight authentication protocol. Further, it would be interesting to investigate the proposed technique of lightweight authentication over other families of error correcting codes which can be represented using trellis.
Definition 12: Circuit: any closed path in a graph is called as a circuit.
Definition 13: Connected graph: a graph G is said to be connected if there is a path between every pair of vertices of G.
An instance of graph and other definitions described above are shown in Figure 19 . Definition 15: Spanning tree: spanning tree of a connected graph G is a tree containing all the vertices of G.
Spanning tree consists of all vertices present in the graph without forming cycle or circuit. An example of spanning tree of graph in Figure 19 is shown in Figure 21 . There can be more than one spanning tree for a given graph G.
Definition 16: Cut-set: a cut-set of G is a set of edges whose removal from G disconnects the graph, with a necessary condition that removal of no proper subset of these edges disconnects G. There can be more than one cut-set for a given graph. Consider the graph in Figure 22 , one of the cut-set {a, c, d, f} makes the graph disconnected as shown in Figure 23 . Such set of edges whose removal makes the graph disconnected are called the fundamental cut-set. Definition 17: Fundamental cut-set: considering a spanning tree T of a graph G, take any branch (say b i ). The branch b i being the cutset of T, divides the vertices into two sets such that each set is at one end of it. Take these two sets of vertices in G and the cut-set in G that corresponds to partition.
The circuit obtained by adding a chord to a spanning tree is called a fundamental circuit. In other words, the set of edges whose removal from the connected graph makes exactly the same components of vertices made by the removal of a branch from spanning tree. By adding a branch or chord c (from vertex D to E) to spanning tree in graph shown in Figure 21 forms a circuit {ABDECA} which is fundamental circuit. 
